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Abstract 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework to identify the potential sources of contagion in 
emerging bond markets and the mechanisms through which shocks originating in a particular 
emerging or mature market are likely to be transmitted across countries and markets. We 
then apply this framework to the emerging countries initially included in the EMBI Global 
Index over the period 1997-2005. We put into light that emerging markets became less and 
less intertwined over the recent period, and that, at present, the risk of contagion may come 
mainly from events taking place into mature markets. Finally, we derive policy 
recommendations in order to reduce emerging countries debt variability thus making them 
less vulnerable to a shock that takes place in mature markets. Sound macroeconomic policies, 
and in particular, prudent fiscal ones, could enhance government discipline and limit 
contagion effects in a wake of a global shock or a shock affecting another emerging country. 
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1 Introduction 
A salient feature of emerging markets since mid 1990s onwards has been their proneness to 
volatility spillovers and contagion across countries and markets during crisis episodes. In a 
context of increased market interdependence, apparently isolated events, initially affecting a 
particular country or market, may rapidly grow global. International liquidity crises are then 
likely to occur independently of the state of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The Tequila crisis of 1994-95, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default and the collapse 
of LTCM in 1998, the Brazilian real devaluation at the beginning of 1999, the US High-Yield 
sell-off in 2000 or the run-up to the Argentina debt default in late 2001, were systemic events 
rippling through countries or markets around the world. The understanding of the 
underlying transmission mechanisms becomes essential in order to identify the nature of 
shock wave propagation at the international level and the potential sources of risk to the 
emerging market (EM) class. The questions we are trying to address in this paper are the 
following: What are the roles of the local and global factors in explaining market 
comovements? Is there still a risk of contagion nowadays? 
We chose to focus on the emerging debt market because portfolio investment has been one of 
the major sources of financing to emerging countries from the beginning of 1990s onwards. 
Its tremendous growth, accelerating in the second half of the 1990s, was fuelled by the 
increased recourse of emerging countries public sector to financing in international markets. 
At the same time, emerging debt markets were exposed to external shocks or shifts in market 
behaviour and show high variability, especially in times of stress. 
The analysis of emerging bond market comovement has become all the more important as 
financial crises in EMs have often been preceded or followed by sovereign debt crises (e.g. 
Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2001 or Venezuela in 2002). Vulnerabilities in 
the banking sector and/or turbulence in the exchange market are likely to trigger a sovereign 
default and herding behaviour by liquidity-constrained investors. The causality running from 
either banking or currency crises to sovereign debt crises could be explained by the 
dangerous structure of public debt (rather short-term, currency-denominated or exchange 
rate indexed), as well as by the existence of implicit or explicit public guarantees on the 
private sector debt. For instance, in the wake of a banking crisis affecting a poorly regulated 
financial sector, the losses accumulated on the asset side of the corporate balance sheets are 
financed by public spending. The bailout of distressed banks thus deteriorates the public 
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sector stance and raises doubts about the government ability to service its debt (e.g. 
Argentina in 2001-02). Conversely, doubts about public debt sustainability may end up in a 
confidence crisis in international markets. The subsequent withdrawal of international 
lenders from EM leads to a sudden reversal of foreign capital flows. The collapse of the 
currency raises the burden of foreign currency-denominated public debt therefore making the 
sovereign default even more likely to occur (e.g. Russia in 1998). 
The correlation analysis is one of the major strategies to measure the cross-country 
transmission of shocks, in the now vast literature on contagion. In the broad sense, 
contagion1 was first quantified as an increase in the cross countries/markets linkages in the 
aftermath of a crisis, relative to the period leading up to the crisis (see early papers by King 
and Wadhwani (1990), Lee and Kim (1993) and more recently Calvo and Reinhart (1996), 
Frankel and Schmukler (1998)). In the wake of the Asian crisis, the presence of contagion 
inferred from increased cross-country correlation coefficients following a shock to one country 
has been challenged by Ronn (1998) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 02). They showed that 
the unadjusted correlation coefficient used in previous studies on contagion is upward biased 
during periods of market turmoil. Under specific hypotheses, it is then possible to adjust the 
sample cross-market correlation coefficients for changes in the volatility of returns in the 
shock-originating country. An implicit assumption of the underlying model of contagion is 
that the increased volatility is responsible for the rise in the correlation coefficients of cross-
market asset returns. However, Yoon (2002) notes that the contagion may be due to other 
factors than increased volatility and that the results are strongly dependant upon the 
underlying distribution of the data-generating process2. 
Apart from these technical shortcomings of the correlation methods, we can also highlight an 
intuitive one: the role of so-called “third factors”, mainly global financial factors driving the 
market comovement. The prevalence of the global factor upon which EMs are more and 
more dependent, may overshadow the “true” EM comovement. In order to address some of 
the shortcomings of the use of unadjusted aggregate correlation coefficients, we stick in this 
paper to a more restrictive definition of contagion viewed as excess comovement, that is, the 
transmission of shocks from one market or country to the others, unexplained either by 
                                                 
1 Viewed as the transmission of shocks across countries/markets 
2 When returns follow, for instance, a STUR process, heteroskedasticity causes the correlation coefficients 
to be biased downward. 
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common shocks or by fundamental links among the countries. By adopting a three-factor 
model of EM bond returns, we are trying to address the question whether the increases in 
the EMs comovement usually associated with crises episodes, are attributable to common 
shocks or to a “pure” contagion phenomenon. 
Let us briefly review the empirical and theoretical literature on excess comovement to which 
our paper is related. The first authors that had quantified pure contagion effects in mature 
markets were Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990). After taking into account common 
fundamentals, they showed that there is a residual comovement between stocks from very 
different industries and thus characterized by different idiosyncratic fundamentals. By 
contrast, little is known with regard to EMs as far as the residual comovement is concerned. 
Masson (1999) identifies three components of the exchange rate variations, namely: 
“monsoonal” or common shocks simultaneously affecting all countries, spillovers occurring 
through trade and economic relations and a residual, that is the component unexplained by 
the previous systematic relations and referred to as “contagion”. Nevertheless, the first two 
components cannot account for the joint evolution of speculative pressures on pegged 
exchange rate regimes in EMs following the Mexican peso devaluation at the end of 1994 or 
the Thai currency crisis of July 1997. Moreover, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) propose a 
two-factor model (the factors being the US equity market return and a regional equity 
portfolio return) with time-varying betas and apply it to stock markets in Europe, South-
East Asia and Latin America during the Mexican and Asian crises in the 1990s. They find 
strong evidence of “additional” contagion, defined as excess correlation of the idiosyncratic 
residuals in the case of the Asian crisis. As far as emerging debt markets are concerned, the 
studies of pure contagion mainly focus on countries credit ratings or spreads (Valdés (1997), 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998)). The common factors are, in this case, the variables driving the 
probability that the government services its debt. After correction, the correlation of 
residuals indicates the presence of pure contagion in the case of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. 
Regarding the interpretation of the excess comovement, the literature attributes this residual 
comovement to rational/irrational market behaviour whose driving forces may be exogenous 
or endogenous to financial markets. First, investors’ behaviour may be the consequence of an 
exogenous change affecting their expectations, their risk perception or their degree of 
confidence. Multiple equilibria (Jeanne (1997), Jeanne and Masson (2000)), wake-up calls 
(Goldstein (1998), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)) or shifts in 
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investors’ risk appetite (Kumar and Persaud (2001)) are the main explanations of markets 
comovement according to this view. Second, the endogenous instability view, with which our 
paper is related, supposes that market practices and investors’ strategies, even rational at 
the individual level, may result in excess volatility and comovement beyond fundamental 
links or common shocks. The rationale for their behaviour may lie in the presence of market 
imperfections and coordination problems. On one side, presence of high information costs 
(exacerbated by the financial integration) may lead to imperfect/heterogeneous knowledge of 
country specific conditions and to herding behaviour by global investors (Calvo (1999), 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Kodres and Pristker (2002)). On the other side, liquidity 
constraints and investors’ incentives in global financial market may have a similar effect. 
Models of shock transmission based on portfolio rebalancing show that an adverse shock that 
takes place in a particular market/country is likely to increase the overall risk exposure of 
globally diversified portfolios. In a rational way, and based on the same methods of potential 
loss estimation (Value-at-Risk3), investors try to limit their loss in the particular 
market/country by first selling off the assets carrying the highest risk. For instance, during 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98, South Korean banks, which had previously accumulated Brazilian 
and Russian bonds, abruptly sold them out, in search of immediate liquidity. As a 
consequence, asset prices in the issuing countries sank, dragging other EM valuations in their 
fall. Indeed, a liquidity shock to one market lowers the liquidity of market operators’ 
liquidity and induces portfolio rebalancing to meet market regulations or margin calls4. 
Credit rationing phenomena are likely to occur, driving investors to shed assets from other 
markets/risk classes, whatever the origin of the shock. 
The understanding of the origins and mechanisms of pure contagion in emerging debt 
markets thus becomes essential in order to assess the potential risks to the EM class and 
derive policy recommendations. We therefore propose a conceptual framework for shock 
transmission at the international level with the aim at identifying the potential sources of 
risk in emerging bond markets and to explain the mechanisms through which a local or 
global event ripples through countries and markets. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
characteristics of the emerging debt market. In Section 3 we propose the conceptual insights 
                                                 
3 See Schinasi and Smith (1999). 
4 See Valdès (1997), Chakravorti, Ilyina and Lall (2003). 
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regarding the potential sources of risk to the EM class and the shock transmission 
mechanism in the wake of a local or global shocks. In Section 4 we present the main 
methodological issues, describe the data and provide an application of our theoretical 
framework to the recent events of market turmoil having affected the EM over the period 
1997-2005. In Section 5 we derive some policy implications. The last section concludes. 
2 A brief overview of the emerging debt market 
The emerging debt market originates in the attempts of the international financial 
community to restructure international banking debt involved in the sovereign debt defaults 
in Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s. Structural reform and debt restructuring 
through debt-securities swaps were the key elements of this program. The new dollar-
denominated assets called “Brady bonds” were guaranteed on their principal and/or partly 
on their interests by US-TB of similar maturity. Following the first Brady Plan for Mexico 
in 1990, from 1990 through 1994, about twenty emerging countries adopted debt-
restructuring plans in the context of structural adjustment programs (PAS) supervised by 
the IMF. As a consequence, many heavily indebted countries gained access to international 
capital markets. Apart from Brady bonds, euro-bonds (dollar but also euro and yen-
denominated) are also traded in the secondary market for debt. As Figure 1 below shows, 
these securities have progressively substituted to Brady bonds in the total debt market 
outstanding. 
Figure 1: Debt instruments in the secondary market (Source: BIS (2002)) 
The spectacular rise of EM debt securities outstanding during the second half of the 1990s is 
mainly the consequence of the rise of public debt financed in international markets. Financial 
liberalization and market deregulation in the 1990s brought about financial development 
(through increased competition and diversification) and contributed to the development of 
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bond markets. The need of sterilization of large capital inflows in presence of fixed exchange 
rate regimes or the implementation of fiscal adjustment and stabilisation policies in the wake 
of major financial crises, contributed to emerging bond market deepening.  
But, at the same time, emerging debt market proved to be highly volatile. From the 
beginning of the 1990s onwards, with the gradual integration of EMs into the global markets, 
emerging debt market bond returns have been characterized by large, simultaneous 
fluctuations, of greater amplitude than it could have been inferred from the macroeconomic 
trends of the issuing countries. The strategy of financial liberalization was expected to bring 
about more risk diversification opportunities and a better response of assets prices to adverse 
shocks. Nevertheless, the financial crises having affected emerging countries from mid 1990s 
onwards have been accompanied by large fluctuations and volatility spillovers across 
countries and markets. The comovement of EM debt bonds returns and spreads generally 
reflects global investors’ undifferentiated attitude to emerging debt valuations. As high-
yielding, but also highly risky assets, EM debt bonds are exposed to portfolio rebalancing 
during turbulent times. Looking for liquidity, investors try to sell risky assets in the first 
place, in order to limit the potential loss of their portfolio. This strategy may concern 
different asset classes (stocks, bonds) or different risk categories (speculative, gilt-edge or 
risk-free bonds, for instance). 
3 Shock transmission mechanisms-Key conceptual Issues 
In this section we propose a conceptual framework based on the evolution of EM spreads and 
aggregate correlations in order to characterize investors’ attitudes towards risk in EM, 
highlight the potential sources of risks to the EM class and disentangle the roles of external 
and country specific comovement. 
3.1 Potential sources of risk to the EM class: specific or external-driven comovement? 
Generally, comovements in emerging bond markets can be captured by the rolling average 
correlation of bond returns. These returns may be driven by a wide range of underlying 
factors either external or internal to the asset class or to the issuing country. Therefore we 
expect that the eventual market comovement be explained by heterogeneous factors. 
We can roughly divide these factors in two categories, namely: 
- Common external factors characterizing developed countries (in particular the US); 
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- Factors other than the common external ones, accounting for the residual comovement of 
EMs. These factors can be attributed to the international investors’ behaviour that shift 
between asset classes and markets according to their anticipations and attitude towards risk. 
Let us consider the standard single-factor model of individual country returns (for two 
countries i, j (i≠j)):  
iii fR εβ +⋅=  
jjj fR εβ +⋅=                                                                           (1) 
where iR  and jR  denote the country returns, f the common external factor, coefficients iβ  
and jβ  the sensibilities of countries i, j returns to variations in the global factor f and 
residuals iε , jε  the idiosyncratic country-specific factors. 
In order to disentangle the role of the common external and country specific factors during 
episodes of market turbulence, we use two indicators of market comovement. First, we 
estimate the correlation coefficient of returns labelled unadjusted correlation coefficient in 
the remainder of the paper: 
),( jiunadj RRρρ =                                   (2) 
Second, we estimate the correlation coefficient of residuals or adjusted correlation coefficient: 
    2/12/1 )'()'(
)'(
),( 
jjii
ji
jiadj
εεεε
εε
εερρ
⋅⋅⋅
⋅
==                           (3)  
and use it as measure of the comovement in bond returns after removing the influence of 
common external shocks. A significant increase in this second indicator could be viewed as 
evidence of “pure contagion” or excess comovement unexplained by the evolution of global 
factors. 
As far as the relationship between the two indicators of comovement is concerned, identical 
correlations before and after the correction for the presence of external factors suggests that 
the impact of these factors is irrelevant and comovement is fully explained by local factors 
( 0, =jiβ ). Unadjusted correlation higher than the adjusted one implies that the two country 
returns are correlated in the same way with the common external factor f. Conversely, 
rolling adjusted correlation coefficients higher than the unadjusted ones indicate that a part 
of the “true” comovement of EMs is overshadowed by general trends taking place in mature 
markets. In the case in which EMs are oppositely linked to the common external factors, 
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removing the impact of this common external factor will actually strengthen the linkages 
between emerging countries bond returns. 
In order to identify the potential sources of risk to the EM class, we then focus on the period 
leading up to a global or country-specific event and give the major insights of what we are 
expecting to find (see Table 1). An increase in the unadjusted correlation coefficients while 
the adjusted ones are constant or decreasing indicates that risks of a sell-off in EM stem 
mainly from a shock occurring in mature markets. Conversely, constant or decreasing 
unadjusted correlation coefficients while the unadjusted ones are increasing in the run-up to 
a crisis warn about a risk of “pure contagion” originating in a given emerging country. A 
concomitant rise in both correlations during tranquil times indicates that the risk of a broad-
based sell-off could come from either front: global factors as well as a given event in another 
EM. Finally, low or decreasing adjusted and unadjusted correlations coefficients indicates 
that the given event was largely unanticipated by markets.  
 unadjρ   adjρ Source of risk 
	 ≈;  Mature markets 
≈;  	 Emerging markets 
	 	 Mature and emerging markets 
≈;  ≈;  Investors’ lack of anticipation 
Table 1: Evolution of general and EM-driven comovement during the  
pre crisis period and the potential sources of risk to the EM class 
Let us now introduce the three factors used as proxies for the global variables driving part of 
the comovement in emerging bond markets. 
3.2 Global factors description 
Investors in EM bonds are facing two kinds of risks: default risk, defined as the implicit 
probability valued by the market as to the sustainability of sovereign debt and market risk, 
measured by the price volatility of the claim and reflecting the random nature of investors’ 
gains from securities sales in the secondary market. 
It is worth noticing that the sovereign default risk on euro-bonds had been historically very 
low until the Russian and Argentinean debt crises in the second half of the 1990s. As far as 
the market risk is concerned, the high price volatility can be explained by the market 
structure, insufficient developed and highly concentrated, as well by broad-based sell-offs by 
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investors in times of stress. Consequently, when assessing EM comovement, it is difficult to 
disentangle the impact of specific and global factors on the dynamics and valuation of both 
kinds of risk. Due to its specific nature, trends in emerging debt market are closely tied to 
developments in mature markets of industrial countries and in particular in the US. 
Therefore, in our analysis, we focus on what appeared to us to be the three major 
benchmarks of the US markets because they are the most likely to induce fluctuations in 
EMs returns5. The global factors presented hereafter will be used to capture the impact of 
international conditions (the factor f in the model 1) on emerging bond returns. 
3.2.1 Risk-free interest rate index 
Among the three global factors, the most relevant for characterizing financial conditions 
according to which emerging bonds prices are settled is the US monetary policy. Studies on 
capital flows volatility showed that emerging bonds returns are sensitive to variations in the 
international risk-free interest rates. Moreover, changes in the US long-term interest rates 
are likely to be followed by similar changes in long-term interest rates in other G-7 
economies (Calvo, Leidermann and Reinhart (1993), Calvo and Reinhart (1996)). As the 
individual countries bonds included in the EMBI Global index are denominated in US dollars 
and their returns benchmarked against the US risk-free interest rates, the US-TB seems to 
be the most appropriate variable to capture investors risk aversion attitude. Therefore, we 
take into account the US Treasury Bill returns for maturity compatible with that of bonds 
included in the EMBI Global (i.e. 5 to 7 years). The interest rates on Treasury Bills are 
virtually risk free rates and are commonly accepted as reflecting the general level of interest 
rates in the US economy. The evolution of the US-TB Index compared to the average return 
on EM bonds included in the EMBI Global Index, for the year 1998, is illustrated on Figure 
2  (see Appendix 2 for its evolution over the rest of the period). The evolution of bond 
returns sensitivities to changes in the US-TB returns, as illustrated in Appendix 3, is a good 
indicator of changes in market behaviour and investors’ risk aversion during crisis times. 
The US-TB is characterized by lower risk of variation than EM bonds or US-High Yields and 
also by a lower return. Generally, the yield on EM bonds is composed of the yield on the 
underlying US-TB and a default premium (spread) due to the existence of a country default 
                                                 
5 As the EMBI Global is composed of dollar-denominated EM bonds, we avoid using other non-US 
variables (for instance European or composite indexes) for our common factors in order to evacuate the 
additional and intractable problem implied by the exchange rate expectations issues. 
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probability. This probability of default may be close to zero whenever markets have 
confidence in the government ability to pay off his debt reflecting improved perceptions of 
credit quality. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of US-TB and average EMBI Global returns-1998 
Conversely, when market participants put into question the government ability to repay his 
loans, the yield on EM bond will rise in order to compensate the security holders for the 
increased risk they undertake. During market rallies, whenever the EM prospects are 
encouraging, investors dump low yielding risk free TB and buy emerging debt securities that 
offer a higher return. The higher liquidity and the lower market risk come at the price of 
lower rates of return than debt or equity securities. The increase in the demand for high-
yield EM bonds will eventually lead to a decline in spreads. This trend may also be the 
consequence of low risk-free interest rates that reduce the debt service and an improvement 
in their macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Conversely, global investors may shift to TB in times of stress, whenever they have a 
perception of heightened risk and are uncertain as to the economic prospects in emerging 
countries. A confidence crisis may erupt and prompt investors to reassess their exposures and 
repatriate funds away from emerging debt markets irrespective of the issuer quality, as long 
as the securities are carrying a non zero market risk. The flight to safety effect has often 
been a common pattern of crisis episodes. 
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3.2.2 Equity market index 
We took into account the SPX-Index (Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Stock Price Index)  
i.e. the composite index of US stock market as a proxy for the stock market portfolio6. Unlike 
other stock market indexes (e.g. Dow Jones Industrial Average) which track the value of a 
portfolio with one share of each stock, the SPX-Index reflects the value of a portfolio that 
holds shares in each firm in proportion to the number of outstanding shares. The behaviour 
of the SPX-Index is thus similar to that of the entire US stock market7. Its evolution 
compared to the average return on EM bonds included in the EMBI Global Index, for the 
year 1998, is illustrated on Figure 3 (see Appendix 2 for its evolution over the rest of the 
period).  
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Figure 3: Evolution of SPX and average EMBI Global returns-1998 
Emerging bond sensitivities to changes in equity market returns could be viewed as a proxy 
for the global portfolio relocations between bonds and equity. The investors’ behaviour 
towards stocks depends on the growth perspectives of the concerned country (higher rates of 
                                                 
6 US and Euro stock markets have closely evolved from 1997 onwards. Therefore we think that the use of 
a composite equity index reflecting the evolution of US, European and Japanese equity indexes would be 
unlikely to provide new information as there is a strong correlation between equity indexes of the major 
world markets. 
7 SPX-Index is a market capitalization-weighted index that tracks the continuous price only and daily 
total return performance of 500 common stocks of leading domestic and foreign companies in leading 
industries within the US that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and the Nasdaq National Market System. It represents a measure of large 
capitalization stocks and accounts for about 64 percent of the market value of shares listed on the three 
exchanges. 
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investment, productivity growth, etc). Therefore, investors tend to prefer equities whenever 
the economy is doing well and shift to safer assets whenever the situation deteriorates. 
3.2.3 US High Yield corporate sector index 
We take into account the performance of the US High Yield corporate sector with the aim of 
capturing the global investors’ behaviour regarding two competing fixed-income asset classes 
(USHY and EMBI Global). The US corporate high yield bonds are often perceived by global 
investors as competing asset class to EM bonds. This is due to the higher risk (and returns) 
associated to the high yield sector compared to TB or US investment-grade bonds, making 
them similar in some way to the EM bonds. Over the period under consideration the USHY 
sector experienced downgrading and massive sell-offs that had an impact on the emerging 
bond markets as well. The selected JOAO Index is characterized by an average rating 
comparable to that of emerging markets (below (BBB)/(Baa) according to S&P/Moody’s 
ratings). As far as emerging debt securities are concerned, their notation ranks from selective 
default (SD)/(C) to (A-) /(A3)8. Therefore the two indexes (US-HY and EMBI Global) are 
representative of EM and US high-yield fixed-income securities that roughly reflect the same 
degree of risk. Nonetheless, the relationship between HY returns and EM debt returns is not 
straightforward. In the context of increased risk aversion, investors are likely to treat these 
two assets classes indiscriminately by selling them out against risk-free assets in search of 
instant liquidity. Troubles in the US-HY sector often reverberate through the EMs and, over 
the last years, sell-offs in the first market have triggered similar sell offs in the latter market. 
Turbulence in the HY sector (as it was the case during the US-HY crisis in the last quarter 
of 2000) could be associated by global investors with an increase in the overall risk of the 
portfolio. In this case, investors tend to reduce the exposure in similar securities in terms of 
risk (in particular, the EM bonds).  
However, investors may have a different attitude as regards these two asset classes according 
to the sovereign and corporate default risk perception. If there are concerns about the ability 
of corporate/sovereign issuers to service or to roll-over their debt in the HY/EM bond 
markets, we could expect global investors (in particular cross-over investors) to shift to the 
                                                 
8 Most of the time, the major part of EM securities are viewed as “speculative ”, that is of low solvency 
and whose ratings rank from (B-)/(B3) and (BB+)/(Ba1)). Nevertheless, over the recent period, an 
increasing number of emerging countries have graduated to investment grade quality and are rated 
(BBB)/(Baa2) or even (A-)/(A3). 
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alternative market more attractive in terms of risk-return. For instance, doubts about the 
sequencing of lenders reimbursement in the case of a sovereign debt crisis, and sometimes, 
higher market risk associated to EM bonds compared to corporate HY ones, leads to a 
situation in which the former asset group may be viewed as more prone to a broad-based 
sell-offs (as this was the case during the Argentinean crisis of 2001-02). The evolution of the 
US-HY Index compared to the average return on EM bonds included in the EMBI Global 
Index, for the year 1998, is illustrated on Figure 4 below (see Appendix 2 for its evolutions 
over the rest of the period). 
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Figure 4: Evolution of US-HY and average EMBI Global returns-1998 
In a context of a diversified portfolio, these three factors may be viewed as the alternative 
assets to EM bonds. We furthermore describe different portfolio rebalancing strategies in 
reference to the main asset classes (EM bonds, corporate HY bonds, stocks and treasury 
bills) in order to identify the mechanisms through which shocks originating in an emerging or 
in a mature market are transmitted across countries. 
3.3 Impact of global and country specific shocks on spreads and cross-country average 
correlations 
The recent episodes of market turbulence were characterized by an increase in cross country 
market correlations- but the question is whether this increase is attributable to common 
external shocks or to a “pure” contagion phenomenon, explained by a specific event taking 
place in an EM. Therefore, we propose a conceptual framework, from a two-country 
perspective, in order to analyse the impact of EM specific events as well as global shocks (in 
particular US long-term interest rate variations, boom/busts in US- HY and equity markets) 
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on EM spreads as well on the two indicators of market comovement (  adjρ ,  unadjρ ). We now 
adopt the point of view of an investor holding a diversified portfolio at the international level 
composed of the four types of assets previously mentioned. The country-specific or external 
shocks refer to volatility shocks. They lead to an increase in the conditional variance of the 
asset traded on that market and in the portfolio global risk exposure. If all the market 
operators follow the same management rule (of Value-at-Risk type), then, portfolio 
relocations may result in herding behaviour as regards to the asset they are trying to get rid 
of. The rise in volatility and the intensification of cross markets linkages will lead to greater 
losses than those implied by the initial positions. We therefore try to explain, in terms of 
portfolio composition, why investors are likely to sell out all risky assets they hold whenever 
an adverse shock hits one of them. The assets broad-based sell-off is then synonymous of 
contagion in financial markets. 
Consider two emerging countries i and j, issuers of assets A and B respectively, and suppose 
that the (positive or negative) specific shock affects country i. The investors’ decisions and 
attitude toward risk are perceptible through the evolution of spreads and of the two series of 
correlations (initial and adjusted for the presence of global factors). The tables presented 
hereafter propose different interpretations for all possible transmission mechanisms of shocks 
originating in an particular EM (Tables 2 and 3) or in mature markets, in particular a shock 
affecting the US-LT interest rates (Tables 4 and 5), US equity market (Tables 6 and 7) and 
US-HY market (Tables 8 and 9). 
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
	 
 
 
≈;  
 
 
	 
 
 
Increase in the portfolio risk exposure, investors tend 
to dump risky assets and move either: 
→ Up in the credit quality spectrum (positively 
correlated EM spreads) or  
→ Towards less risky EM bonds (Asset B, negatively 
correlated EM spreads) 
 
 
→EM sell-off 
 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 ≈;  ≈; Increase in the portfolio risk exposure, shift towards 
less risky EM bonds (Asset B) within the EM class. 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 2: Impact of a negative EM specific event (in country i) on spreads and correlations 
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EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
	 
 
≈;  
 
 
Increase in the attractiveness of EM bonds. Investors 
shift to less risky EM bonds (Asset A) 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 
 
 
≈;  
 
	 
 
Increase in the attractiveness of EM bonds.  Investors 
buy either: → Any kind of EM bonds or  
           → Safer EM bonds (Asset A) 
 
→EM rally 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 3: Impact of a positive EM specific event (in country i) on spreads and correlations 
In this configuration, an increase in  unadjρ may indicate that there is a global event also 
driving the comovement. This event can be either an independent event (pure coincidence), 
or a consequence of the specific (negative) EM shock. Whenever spreads 	 and  unadjρ 	, it is 
possible that the EM specific shock ripple through emerging and mature markets altogether 
triggering a global crisis. In this case there is evidence of contagion to mature and EMs 
through a direct (from country i → country j) as well as an indirect link (country i → 
mature markets → country j). 
Let us now consider a shock affecting US-TB returns and the long-term interest rates. This 
kind of shock can also be interpreted in terms of market liquidity: a positive shock (i.e. a fall 
in the interest rates) is often synonymous of excessive liquidity whereas an adverse shock 
may result in a liquidity shortage in mature markets. 
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
	 
≈;  
Increase in the portfolio risk exposure, investors tend 
to dump risky assets and move up in the credit 
quality spectrum. 
→ Sell-off all kinds of risky assets; 
→ Sell-off of most vulnerable EM bonds (of issuers 
whose financial situation is expected to deteriorate) 
 
 
 
→EM sell-off 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 4: Impact of a negative shock affecting the long-term interest rates on spreads and correlations 
 
 
 
	 
 
	 
Investors shift to other more yielding assets like 
emerging debt bonds or High Yield corporate bonds. 
The easing of EM financing conditions may lead to 
improved fundamentals and to EM spread reduction. 
Hence a better investors perception and a broadly based 
buying of all kinds of risky assets. 
 
→EM rally 
Table 5: Impact of a positive shock affecting the long-term interest rates on spreads and correlations 
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In this configuration, a decrease in  unadjρ would suggest that there is a specific EM event also 
driving the comovement. This event can be either an independent event (pure coincidence), 
or a consequence of the (negative or positive) shock on long-term interest rates: anticipating 
a rise/fall in the US-TB yields the investors expect a deterioration/improvement of the 
financial situation of highly indebted EM countries. They may dump the EM asset suddenly 
perceived as riskier as well as other EM assets issued by countries characterized by strong 
fundamental links with the crisis hit country or showing similar macroeconomic 
characteristics. 
Let us now consider a shock affecting mature stock markets. 
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
≈; 
Portfolios rebalancing towards fixed income securities 
(part of which could also entail high exposure to EM): 
→ Broadly-based buying of all kind of EM bonds; 
→ Buying of less risky EM bonds. 
 
 
→EM rally 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
 
	 
 
≈; 
The negative wealth effects are too strong and market 
reacts by shedding either: → All kind of risky assets 
(indiscriminate behaviour) or 
                                       → The riskiest EM bonds 
(shifts within the EM class) 
 
→EM sell-off, 
contagion 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 6: Impact of a negative event affecting the mature equity markets on spreads and correlations 
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
	 
 
≈;  
Investors indiscriminate attitude towards risky assets 
(equity or EM) reflected by a broadly-based buying of 
all kind of EM bonds (positively correlated spreads); 
→Overweighing of less risky EM bonds (negatively 
correlated EM spreads) 
 
→EM rally 
 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
 
	 
 
≈;  
Global portfolio reallocations from fixed-income 
securities to equity.  Investors dump either →All kind 
of risky assets, or  
                                                             →Only the 
most vulnerable EM bonds 
 
→EM sell-off, 
contagion 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 7: Impact of a positive event affecting the mature equity markets on spreads and correlations 
In this configuration, a decrease in  unadjρ would suggest that the impact of the external shock 
is not relevant. 
Let us finally consider a shock affecting the US-HY market. 
 18
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
≈;  
Investors shift within the same class of risk, between 
local corporate and EM bonds  
→ Broadly-based buying of all kind of EM bonds;  
→Buying of safer EM bonds (negatively correlated EM 
spreads) 
 
 
→EM rally 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
≈; 
Shock associated to an increase in the overall risk of the 
portfolio. Investors tend to reduce the exposure in 
similar securities in terms of risk (in particular EM) 
and move up in the credit quality spectrum towards 
TB. They dump either 
→All kind of risky assets, indiscriminate behaviour; 
 
→Most vulnerable EM bonds 
 
 
 
 
→EM sell-off 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 8: Impact of a negative shock affecting the HY market on spreads and correlations 
EM 
spreads 
ρunadj ρadj Description Impact on the 
EM market 
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
≈; 
Increase in the attractiveness of securities presenting 
similar degree of risk  (in particular EM bonds) 
→investors indiscriminate behaviour, broadly-based 
buying of EM bonds ;  
→(Substitution effect) overweighing of safer EM bonds 
shifts within the EM class. 
 
 
→EM rally 
→Investors 
discrimination 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
 
 
	 
≈; 
Investors shift within the same class of risk, between 
EM and HY bonds which triggers either a  
→Sell -off of all kind of EM valuations; 
 
→Sell-off of most vulnerable EM valuations; 
 
 
→EM sell-off 
→Investors 
discrimination 
Table 9: Impact of a positive shock affecting the HY market on spreads and correlations 
In this configuration, a decrease in  unadjρ would suggest that the impact of the external shock 
is not relevant. 
We furthermore use this framework in order to assess comovements in EM bond returns and 
disentangle the roles of external and local factors during the recent episodes of market 
volatility over the period 1997-2005. 
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4 Application to the period 1997-2005 
4.1 Methodological Issues and Data 
We use daily and five-day returns for 18 out of 33 emerging countries initially included in 
the JP EMBI Global (Emerging Markets Bond Index Global) according to the data 
availability over the period starting on the 3rd of March 1997 and ending on the 28th of 
February 2005. Data were obtained from Bloomberg. The selected countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Venezuela) accounted 
for 92,4 percent of the Index in 1997 and for 87,5 percent at present9. The EMBI Global 
provided by JP Morgan, is a traditional, market capitalization-weighted index covering the 
EM countries (see Appendix 1 for more details). The adjustment for the presence of common 
external factors is performed using daily and five-day returns10computed from the bond index 
value of total return, according to the following relation: 
)/ln(/ ittitt IIR −− =    i = 1 or 5                       (4) 
where tI  and itI −  represent the closing cumulative total return index level on day t and the 
last total index return on the previous and respectively on the last fifth trading day (t - i, i 
= 1 or 5). tR  is the (log) net rate of return between dates t and t - i (i = 1 or 5) and t the 
trade date (according to the New York bond and holiday calendar and after harmonization 
with available trade dates for the independent variables). In order to deal with missing data 
in some limited cases of market closure among the emerging countries in the EMBI Global, 
we compute the inferred price between the last trading day and the opening day (See note ii) 
in the Appendix 1). Finally, we retained 2005 returns computed on a five-day basis. As far as 
the three US market indicators are concerned (TB, SPX and HY Indexes), we use the daily 
closing prices provided by Bloomberg and compute the daily and respectively 5-day returns 
according to the relation 4. Initially, there were 2015 trading dates for EMBI Global, 2028 
for SPX-Index and 2088 for both US-HY and US-TB Index. After harmonization, we retain 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 1 for changes in the EMBI Global Index composition. The other countries included in the 
Index are Chile, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine and Uruguay. 
10 We obtained more significant results whenever returns are computed over a holding period of five 
trading days as they are less affected by the autocorrelation of day-by-day returns. Therefore we give only 
the results using 5-day returns. See note i) in the Appendix 1. 
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2010 trading dates. Data for non-Asian countries were lagged by one day in order to adjust 
the data for the time difference between Asian and non-Asian markets. 
In order to measure the emerging bond markets comovement and the transmission of shocks 
from one country/region to another, we adopt an approach based on correlations of bond 
returns after controlling for common external factors11. More precisely, the bond returns 
(daily or computed on a 5-day basis, which corresponds to a holding period by international 
investors) are adjusted for the presence of common external factors by performing rolling 
linear regressions of individual countries returns against the US TB5-7Y, SPX-Index and 
High Yield Index. The rolling regressions are performed over a 60-day window in order to 
separate the impact of external, and respectively, idiosyncratic factors of the EMs’ 
comovement. Pairwise correlations are then estimated based on unadjusted and adjusted 5-
day returns over the same 60-day window. By hypothesis, the external factors as endogenous 
variables, cannot explain any variation in the underlying residuals. Therefore, the residuals 
could be viewed as adjusted returns, free from the influence of external common factors. 
Furthermore, the rolling canonical pairwise correlation of the regression residuals will capture 
the excess comovement of bond returns beyond common external factors/shocks. 
The three-factor estimated model can be written as following: 
Suppose 2 emerging countries i, j among the 18 countries in the sample. The model implies 
rolling regressions over a 60-day window of the type: 
  titHYitSPXitTBiiti RRRR ,,3,,2,1,0,, εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=                                         (5)                
  tjtHYjtSPXjtTBjjtj RRRR ,,3,,2,,1,0,, εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=          
where tTBR , , tSPXR ,  and tHYR ,  are the returns of US-TB Index, SPX-Index and US-HY Index, 
β -coefficients reflect the sensitivities of emerging bond returns to changes in global factors 
whereas the residuals ti,ε , tj ,ε capture the impact of local, country-specific factors driving the 
comovement. 
As we have already mentioned in Section 3, the correlation coefficient of residuals becomes a 
measure of the comovement in bond returns after removing the influence of the three 
common external shocks. As far as the three factors loadings are concerned, they can be 
viewed as the sensitivities of emerging bond markets to changes in US-TB, SPX or HY 
Indexes or, equivalently, as a measure of the variation induced in bond returns by a one 
                                                 
11 These factors will affect emerging countries differently according to their macroeconomic characteristics 
(i.e. trade links, international financing requirements, degree of integration in the world economy). 
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percent variation of the exogenous variables. In terms of prices, the beta coefficients measure 
the growth rate of the EM bond price relative to the growth rate of the return on the 
external factors. The evolution of the sensitivities to changes in the global factors for each 
individual country of our sample are given in Appendixes 3 to 5. 
The periods of broad-based buying or selling of EM bonds points out to the presence of 
different factors: external common shocks affecting mature markets, EMs specific shocks, 
commercial, financial or common lender links among countries. The amplitude of average 
correlations of individual countries initial returns make it impossible to disentangle the 
impact of common and local factors. However, the unweighted mean of unadjusted returns of 
countries included in the EMBI Global enables us to evacuate the potential role of 
fundamental factors. Moreover, sample diversification across Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle 
East and Latin America also help evacuate potential financial and real link between 
individual countries in the sample. Therefore, unadjusted correlations will solely reflect the 
influence of global and emerging country specific factors. 
4.2 Main results 
We first present the evolution of an aggregate measure of the two indicators of market 
comovement and the major trends that are emerging. We then apply the previous conceptual 
framework to the major episodes of market turmoil over the period 1997-2005. 
4.2.1 Evolution of the adjusted and unadjusted cross-country average correlations 
Figure 5 plots the evolution of aggregate correlations, unadjusted and adjusted for the 
presence of common external factors, as measures of the overall and respectively the excess 
comovement (pure contagion) in emerging bond markets. Aggregate correlations were 
computed as the average of all 157 pairwise canonical correlations of the 18 countries within 
the sample over a 60-day rolling window. Appendix 6 presents the correlation matrixes of 
individual countries adjusted returns. 
As a general feature, we notice that the adjusted and unadjusted rolling average cross 
correlations have always been positive suggesting a tendency of individual country returns to 
move together. For instance, annual average correlations represent 0.56 in 1997, 0.59 in 1998, 
0.41 in 1999, 0.43 in 2000, 0.42 in 2001, 0.24 in 2002, 0.27 in 2003, 0.43 in 2004 and 0.38 in 
2005.  
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Figures 5-6: Evolution of adjusted and unadjusted rolling average correlations and  
EMBI Global spreads (see also Appendix 7) 
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It is worth noticing that the size of the rolling regression window (60 days) can only 
influence the correlation persistence in time12, but our objective here is to put into light the 
ascending and descending movements, the peaks and droughts in emerging debt markets 
comovement. 
The large spikes in global average correlations are usually associated with major episodes of 
market turmoil suggesting less investor discrimination during sell-offs compared with periods 
of market rallies. This reinforces the “crossover” nature of investors that tend to unwind 
their open positions in EMs during bad times. The most important rises in correlations take 
place during the Hong Kong stock market crash of October 1998 (when the potential of 
contagion of the Asian crisis to global financial markets become clear), Russian sovereign 
default of August 1988 (of around 0.8) and also during the 2000 generalized sell-off of 
Argentinean bonds and speculative corporate bonds in the US-HY market (of around 0.55). 
This indicates investors’ indiscriminate behaviour during crisis times, when sell-offs of EM 
bonds are mainly motivated by the concern of lowering the global risk exposure of their 
portfolio. However, over the recent period, the peaks associated to crisis episodes are 
considerably lower than the levels previously reached (for instance, during the Brazilian real 
depreciation of 2002, the average correlations are inferior to 0.4). 
At the same time, we highlight a gradual decline in both adjusted and unadjusted series over 
the whole period under consideration. The decline is more marked in the case of the adjusted 
correlations that are proxies for the EM-driven comovement. Thus, emerging bond returns 
comovement appears to be less and less specific to EMs and mainly driven by events taking 
place in mature markets, as showed by the widening gap between adjusted and unadjusted 
average correlations over the two last years. 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of EMBI Global average spread over the period under 
consideration. The all time high, of more than 1600 b.p., was reached during the Russian 
crisis and the LTCM collapse of summer-fall 1998. The peaks of intermediate size are 
associated with systemic events taking place in mature or EMs: Brazilian real devaluation of 
1999 (spreads of around 1100 b.p.), September 11, 2001 (spreads as high as 900 b.p.) or 
Argentinean banking crisis of 2001 and Brazilian real depreciation of 2002 (spreads of around 
800 b.p.). These trends seem to suggest better investors’ differentiation of the risks carried 
by EM bonds during the recent period. This could be due to the absence, over the recent 
                                                 
12 Similar results are obtained using a 90-day window or 10-day returns. 
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period, of major adverse event in EMs and by a lower risk taking on the side of investors in 
the wake of the Asian crisis. Additionally, volumes traded today in international markets are 
lower to those having preceded the outburst of the Asian crisis. Precisely, international debt 
flows decreased from $140 billion in 1996 and $196 billion in1997 to $56 billion in 1998 and 
$98 billion in 2000 (IMF). We also have to bear in mind that some emerging countries opted 
for greater exchange rate flexibility, placing inflation targeting mechanisms at the core of 
their monetary policy (for instance, Philippines, South Africa, Mexico and Poland in 2000). 
Greater flexibility enables them to better cope with external shocks, conditionally on the 
presence of large and developed financial markets providing diversified hedging instruments 
of the exchange rate risk. The quality of the financial systems, which played a major role in 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98, has improved in many emerging countries during the recent 
period. Financial systems are more stable now than at the eve of previous crisis episodes. 
4.2.2 Interpretation of major episodes of market turbulence 1997-2005 
We briefly analyse the evolution of adjusted and unadjusted aggregate correlations in 
connection with the key events, supposed exogenous, taking place during the sample period13. 
Our aim is to identify the potential sources of risk and highlight the roles of global as well as 
country specific factors in explaining the comovements amongst EM returns. 
On July 2, 1997, the Central Bank of Thailand announced the abandonment of the exchange 
rate peg and the move toward a managed floating regime. An IMF stand-by credit of $3.9 
billion was made available. The Thai baht value fell by 15-20 percent. 
1) The Thai baht devaluation (July 2, 1997) seems to have had little impact on investors’ 
attitude toward EM bonds. From Figures 7a-b we can see that both unadjusted and adjusted 
average correlations as well as spreads decreased in the run-up to the crisis indicating that 
this event was largely unanticipated by markets. This negative EM-country specific shock 
triggered a decrease in  unadjρ whereas  adjρ maintained at the same level indicating a lack of 
spillover effects to the other EM or to mature markets. 
                                                 
13 The crisis dates have been established on the basis of the IMF EM Financing (1999-2001), IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report (2002-04), IMF World Economic Outlook (1999-2004) and BIS 68th -74th 
Annual Reports. Spreads on EMBI Global are available starting with 1998. For 1997 we used spreads on 
the EMBI+ provided by Bloomberg. For harmonization purposes, they are presented as 60-day rolling 
average of spreads on individual emerging countries valuations, compared to the US-TB returns. 
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Figures 7a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Thai baht devaluation 
Until October 1997, investors had been treated the Thai baht devaluation as an isolated 
event and thus, they did not anticipate a worsening of other countries’ fundamentals14. We 
are in the presence of a standard currency crisis whose origin lies in the financial sector. 
Investors did not anticipate that the currency crisis would affect long-term growth in South-
East Asia. At the same time, favourable financial conditions at the international level (low 
interest rates) helped to maintain the attractiveness of EM securities, viewed as highly 
profitable by global investors. 
On October 20-23, 1997, the Hong Kong stock market suffered its heaviest loss ever, even 
more marked than that recorded during the 1987 crash. Fears regarding the interest rates 
and pressures on the Hong Kong dollar triggered a drop for a quarter of its value in four 
days. 
2) The Hong Kong stock market crash (October 20-23, 1997) was a negative EM-country 
specific event that marked a reversal in the evolution of spreads and correlations. We assist 
to a change in investors’ attitude towards risk as showed by the significant rise in spreads, 
from nearly 300 b.p. before the crisis to around 700 b.p. in November 1997 (Figure 8b). 
Adjusted correlations, as a measure of the excessive comovement in emerging debt markets, 
reached a peak of 0.53 at the end of October (Figure 8a). The residual comovement doubled 
in the aftermath of the stock market crash, suggesting a broad-based sell-off in EM. The 
                                                 
14 Indeed, further to the Thai baht floating, contagion spread only to other Asian currency markets 
(devaluation of the Philippine peso, depreciation of the Singapore dollar in mid-July, free floating of the 
Indonesian rupee and speculative attack on the Hong Kong dollar in August). 
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Hong-Kong crisis could thus be viewed as a clear example of significant increased market 
comovement after controlling for the common external factors (true contagion). 
 
Figures 8a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Hong Kong stock market crash 
Moreover, the surge in  unadjρ with a peak of 0.8 at the end of October indicates that the 
links among financial markets intensified in the wake of the Hong-Kong market crash. From 
that moment on, the Asian crisis became global and spread to mature markets as well to 
other EMs. Indeed, until the end of the month, Korea and Thailand’s sovereign ratings were 
downgraded by S&P and The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 554 points on October 27, 
the biggest loss since its introduction. Equity markets in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico saw 
their biggest single day losses as the crisis ripples across the globe. On October 31, the Thai 
baht reached its lower level in terms of US dollar since the beginning of the crisis15. At the 
same time, an important IMF standby credit for Indonesia had been approved and financial 
support of $3 billion, immediately disbursed. However, the $23 billion mobilized by the 
international community provided only temporary relief to Asian markets and in November 
1997, the crisis spread to South Korea. 
On August 17, 1998, Russia devaluated the rouble and announced the restructuring of its 
public debt. Payments on short-term government debt were suspended and a moratorium on 
commercial debt service to non-residents imposed. Financial markets had been closed from 
August 8 through October 30. The US Hedge Fund Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) went bankrupt on September 27. 
                                                 
15 Effective devaluation of 37 percent (IMF (1998)) 
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3) The Russian default (August 17, 1998) marked a reversal in emerging debt markets 
comovement from the outburst of the Asian crisis. Figure 9a shows that both correlations 
(  unadjρ ,  adjρ ) increased prior to the crisis and maintained at very high levels during the 
crisis. A possible interpretation would be insufficient investors’ differentiation in the run-up 
to the crisis, and then, “herd behaviour” during or after the crisis. High adjusted and 
unadjusted correlation coefficients indicate a risk of contagion in EMs that could come either 
from mature markets (reflecting the global turbulent situation in the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis) or specific events taking place in Russia. As far as the specific factors are concerned, 
the Russian crisis was triggered by major macroeconomic and financial weaknesses (e.g. 
weakly enforced tax system, high public indebtedness, low industrial production). On 
January 1, 1998 the Russian rouble was pegged to the dollar with a 15 percent fluctuation 
band but in May, the refinancing rate reached 150 percent. Some other EM specific events 
contributed to the investors’ loss of confidence like, for instance, the riots having 
accompanied the adoption of the Currency board in Indonesia, the speculative attacks on the 
South African rand in June, the brutal increase in interest rates in Brazil to levels close to 
those reached during the Asian crisis or the exchange rate pressures in Chile. 
Figures 9a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Russian sovereign default and LTCM crisis 
The sovereign debt moratorium is a negative EM-country specific shock followed by a 
significant rise in spreads and correlations. Spreads soared to an all-time high, of around 
1500 b.p. in September 1998 (Figure 9b) suggesting investors’ higher risk aversion as regards 
the EM group as a whole. As in the case of the Hong-Kong crash, we are in presence of a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
06
/07
/98
14
/07
/98
22
/07
/98
30
/07
/98
07
/08
/98
15
/08
/98
23
/08
/98
31
/08
/98
08
/09
/98
16
/09
/98
24
/09
/98
02
/10
/98
10
/10
/98
18
/10
/98
26
/10
/98
03
/11
/98
unadjusted correlations adjusted correlations
1998
Russian default
Aug. 17, 1998
LTCM  collapse
Sept. 27, 1998
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
06
/07
/98
14
/07
/98
22
/07
/98
30
/07
/98
07
/08
/98
15
/08
/98
23
/08
/98
31
/08
/98
08
/09
/98
16
/09
/98
24
/09
/98
02
/10
/98
10
/10
/98
18
/10
/98
26
/10
/98
03
/11
/98
EMBIGlobal Average spread
1998
Russian default
Aug. 17, 1998
LTCM  collapse
Sept. 27, 1998
 28
systemic event taking its origin in a particular emerging country and having important spill-
over effects on both mature and EM. Investors’ “flight to quality and liquidity”, in a context 
of increased uncertainty in financial markets, led to indiscriminate sell-offs of EM bonds. In 
September, the confidence crisis gained stock markets of Latin America and exchange rates 
came under pressure16. Banks, Hedge Funds and other financial institutions in industrial 
countries started accumulating important losses. The situation worsened with the collapse of 
the US Hedge Fund LTCM on September 27, 1998. Even if it represents the direct 
consequence of the Russian crisis, the LTCM collapse could explain the very high levels 
reached by spreads and unadjusted correlation during the period17.   
The conjunction of a tightly managed exchange rate regime and growing internal and 
external macroeconomic imbalances proved unsustainable in Brazil. At the end of 1998, the 
exchange rate came under great pressure. Speculative attacks on the Brazilian real ended up 
in its floating at mid-January, 1999. 
4) The Brazilian real devaluation (January 13, 1999) is characterized by a particular 
configuration of correlations and spreads. Figure 10a-b shows that both correlations 
increased in the run-up to the devaluation indicating the presence of risks originating in 
emerging and mature markets. However, adjusted correlations were higher than the initial 
ones and this suggests that emerging debt markets evolved in opposite way compared to 
mature markets. After correction for the presence of global factors, the “true” comovement is 
higher. Indeed, the run up to the Brazilian real devaluation was characterized by investors’ 
loss of confidence (since the Russian crisis on) in the sustainability of monetary 
arrangements and of the fiscal stance in Brazil and other Latin American countries. On one 
hand, we have to bear in mind that the Brazilian crisis started towards the end of 1998 and 
that expectations about the abandonment of its tightly managed exchange rate arrangement 
and investors’ exit from the EM class occur before the devaluation, as shown by the increase 
in adjusted correlations (  adjρ ). On the other hand, the confluence of shocks in mature 
markets (LTCM collapse, interest rate cuts, boom in equity markets) heightened investors’ 
                                                 
16 Malaysia pegged its currency on the US dollar and adopted capital controls, Colombia widened the exchange rate 
fluctuation band by 9 percent, interest rates in Brazil doubled, reaching 50 percent on September 10, short-term interest 
rates in Mexico peaked at 48 percent, Chile proceeded to interest rate rises and allowed for more exchange rate flexibility 
whereas China tightened foreign exchange regulations (BIS (1999)). 
17 It is worth noticing that LTCM had previously announced (on September 2) annual losses of 52 percent. Nevertheless, 
news of the funds increasing difficulties came to light well before this date. 
 29
risk aversion and made them liquidate positions in EM class and shift towards risk-free 
assets and cash holdings. In the aftermath of the Brazilian real devaluation, spreads and 
adjusted correlations (  adjρ ) decreased, indicating the lack of spillover effects to the other 
EM (i.e. investors discriminate between the country in crisis in the other EM valuations). 
The increase in  unadjρ points out to the presence of another external event affecting the 
market comovement. One possible explanation is that events in Brazil reinforced global 
investors risk aversion already high in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. 
Figures 10a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Brazilian real devaluation 
From the end of the Brazilian currency crisis on, investors seem to better discriminate crisis-
hit countries from the rest of the emerging countries group. The upgrade of South Korea to 
(BBB-) at end-January 2000 seems to confirm the stabilisation trend of Asian financial 
markets. At the same time, high levels of unadjusted correlations (  unadjρ ) indicate a strong 
dependence of emerging debt markets upon global trends. Declining interest rates in major 
mature markets may be the common shock that led to better investors’ differentiation 
between potential borrowers (from Asia and Europe, for instance) once the confidence had 
been re-established. 
In a context of global growth slowdown and declining corporate profits expectations in the 
US, the US High-Yield market experienced an episode of broad-based sell-off in October 
2000. The market closed from October 9 to 20. At the same time, in Latin America, the 
failure of Argentina in committing to control its fiscal deficit raised doubts about the 
government ability to service the public debt and brought about the need for public debt 
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restructuring. In the absence of a strong political commitment to tackle the fiscal difficulties, 
investors progressively lost confidence in the government solvency and triggered a broad-
based sell-off of Argentinean sovereign bonds in October 2000. 
5) In the run-up to the Argentinean sell-off and US-High Yield sell-off (October 2000) we 
notice a sharp increase in both adjusted and unadjusted correlation coefficients (  unadjρ ,  adjρ ) 
indicating that risks of a broad-based sell-off may come either from EMs (e.g. Argentina and 
Turkey fears) or from mature markets (e.g. global earning slowdown, deterioration in US 
credit market, revision of expectations of the US monetary policy, poor performance of 
mature equity markets (Nasdaq), downgrading of the TMT sector, etc). The simultaneous 
occurrence of an adverse EM-country specific and a High-Yield shock triggered an increase in 
spreads and adjusted and unadjusted correlations in the aftermath of these events (see 
Figures 11a-b). This configuration indicates that global investors evaluated the default risk 
as being high. They tended to dump risky assets (risky corporate bonds or EM bonds 
altogether) and moved up in the credit quality spectrum toward safer assets (TB for 
instance). However, adjusted correlations (  adjρ ) maintained below 0.5. 
Figures 11a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Argentinean sell-off and US-HY sell-off 
The decreasing adjusted correlations points out to better investors’ differentiation of EM 
bonds according to their risk. The most affected by the shift in market confidence seem to be 
the bonds issued by highly indebted countries, lacking fiscal discipline or/and having a 
fragile banking sector. 
Massive capital inflows in Turkey in the 1990s had been channelled through the domestic 
banking sector to the public sector  one. The worsening of the public and current account 
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deficits in 2000, as well as the abrupt rise in the short-term external debt (accounting for 130 
percent of foreign reserves) resulted in high interest rate variability. At the end of 2000, we 
assist to a broad-based sell-off of sovereign bonds and to a liquidity shortage in the interbank 
market that led to the failure of a medium-sized bank. The IMF intervened through a $10 
billion support package for crisis resolution, conditionally on the adoption of structural 
reforms. However, underlying fragilities remained. Political conflicts in early 2001 raised new 
doubts on the part of investors, as to the government ability to restructure the banking 
sector and to control inflation. On February 22, 2001, massive capital outflows, as well as the 
steep rise in interest rates, constrained the monetary authorities to let the currency float. 
6) From Figure 12a we can see that the Turkey sell-off (end November 2000) had been 
preceded by a spike in  adjρ whereas  unadjρ decreased, suggesting that the risks of a sell-off to 
the EM stem from country-specific shocks. In the aftermath of this country specific event, 
both correlations and spreads were on a downward path, indicating investors’ differentiation 
(shifts within the EM class, towards safer valuations) and the lack of spillover effects. 
However, in the aftermath of the Turkey devaluation (22 February 2001), we can notice a 
brief episode of sell-off in EM that reverberated through mature markets as shown by the 
increasing correlations and EM spreads (Figure 12b). The correlations decreased and 
maintained at low level immediately after the announcement of a multilateral support 
packages by the IMF. Despite investors’ discrimination, EM spreads maintained at a high 
level, indicating their increased risk aversion (mainly caused by fears about the situation in 
Argentina and Brazil). 
Figures 12a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Turkey sell-off and devaluation 
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
19
/10
/00
28
/10
/00
06
/11
/00
15
/11
/00
24
/11
/00
03
/12
/00
12
/12
/00
21
/12
/00
30
/12
/00
08
/01
/01
17
/01
/01
26
/01
/01
04
/02
/01
13
/02
/01
22
/02
/01
03
/03
/01
12
/03
/01
21
/03
/01
30
/03
/01
unadjusted correlations adjusted correlations
2000-01
Turkey devaluation 
Fev. 22, 2001
Turkey sell-off 
End Nov, 2000
600
620
640
660
680
700
720
740
760
780
800
19
/10
/00
28
/10
/00
06
/11
/00
15
/11
/00
24
/11
/00
03
/12
/00
12
/12
/00
21
/12
/00
30
/12
/00
08
/01
/01
17
/01
/01
26
/01
/01
04
/02
/01
13
/02
/01
22
/02
/01
03
/03
/01
12
/03
/01
21
/03
/01
30
/03
/01
EMBIGlobal Average spread
2000-01
Turkey devaluation 
Fev. 22, 2001
Turkey sell-off 
End Nov, 2000
 32
Increasing liquidity needs led Argentinean authorities to swap around $30 billion of maturing 
external debt for longer-term bonds in June 2001. One month later, the authorities 
announced a program of fiscal balance imposing that public expense should not be higher 
than the effectively collected revenues. The fall in the government fiscal revenues and doubts 
about the viability of the Currency Board resulted in a bank run by domestic lenders. 
Households began to withdraw their savings from local banks. The banking crisis lasted until 
December 2001 when the government restricted the access to bank accounts (deposit 
freezing, “corralito”) and closed insolvent financial institutions. 
7) In the case of the Argentinean crisis (declaration of the sovereign debt moratorium) of 
July 2001  unadjρ and  adjρ evolved extremely close, before, during and after the crisis which 
may indicate that risks to the EM class stemmed mainly from emerging countries specific 
events (developments in the highly correlated Argentinean and Brazilian emerging debt 
markets, Brazil’s energy crisis and political instability). 
 
Figures 13a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Argentinean banking crisis 
As Figure 13a shows, the Argentinean crisis is another case of increased market comovement 
in the post-crisis period, during which the investors’ fears regarding Argentina specific risks 
spread across EMs (broad-based sell-off confirmed by the rise in  adjρ ). This trend is 
confirmed by the sharp increase in the EM spreads in the aftermath of this adverse EM-
country specific shock. The close evolution of the two correlation coefficients suggests that 
the global factors were irrelevant in explaining market comovement during this period. 
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Actually, the favourable context of the monetary easing in the US (which should benefit to 
HY and EM bonds) had been overshadowed by credit concerns in particular EMs. 
The terrorist attack of September 11 affected, for one week, the US equity and fixed income 
markets as well as the Pension Funds. The Federal Reserve reacted promptly by liquidity 
provision to the banking system and policy interest rates cuts. 
8) As showed by Figure 14a, this unanticipated adverse shock affecting mature markets led 
to a slight increase in unadjusted correlations that faded away until October. During this 
period, the emerging debt markets comovement overpassed 0.5 as a result of persistent 
unbalances that undermined investors’ confidence in EM bonds (turmoil in Argentina, energy 
crisis and political instability in Brazil, pressures on the exchange rate in Turkey). 
Figures 14a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during September 11, 2001 
In Argentina, the amplitude of bank deposits flight led the government to impose strict 
controls on bank withdrawals and transfers. At the end of December 2001, the government 
suspended the payment of the external debt. In early January 2002, the Currency Board 
regime was abandoned and the government announced the adoption of a dual exchange rate 
regime, finally replaced by a floating exchange rate one. 
9) In the run-up to the Argentinean default of December 2001-January 2002, we notice an 
increase in  adjρ indicating that risks may come from a shock affecting the EM (Figure 15a). 
However both correlations were extremely low, at around 0.2, suggesting that investors were 
having a differentiated behaviour as regard to EM valuations and had already discounted 
Argentinean bonds. This event is a typical example of an EM anticipated shock perceived as 
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isolated by investors. In the aftermath of the Argentinean default, both correlations 
decreased and investors’ shifted within the EM class, toward safer assets. 
 
Figures 15a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Argentinean default and currency crisis 
Year 2002 proved to be extremely difficult for emerging countries in Latin America. 
Investors’ loss of confidence in the sustainability of the Argentinean public debt resulted in a 
surge in bond spreads (to around 2000 b.p.) and a generalized sell-off of Argentinean bonds 
in June 2002. In late July, the nominal exchange rate of the Brazilian real in terms of US 
dollar pursued its collapse, reaching the 3:1 threshold, the lowest level from the adoption of 
the Real Plan in 1994. 
10) The Brazilian sell-off (mid June 2002) taking place during a period of global turbulence 
in mature markets (Enron scandal, US-HY crisis) was preceded by spikes in both adjusted 
and unadjusted correlations (Figures 16a-b) which indicates that the risks of contagion 
stemmed from shocks originating in both emerging (elections fears in Brazil and Turkey, 
Argentina concerns) and mature markets. 
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Figures 16a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the Brazilian sell-off and depreciation 
These adverse shocks are typical examples of increased market comovement during the crisis 
periods compared to tranquil ones. The increase in both correlations indicates that global 
investors associated these events with an increase in the overall risk of the portfolio. They 
tended to dump risky assets and moved up in the credit quality spectrum, toward TB. 
Similar trends were noticed one month later, in the aftermath of the Brazilian real 
depreciation (end July 2002). 
From mid-2003 onwards, the excess overall liquidity, due to the ease of the monetary 
conditions and investors’ decreasing risk aversion, made EM asset class especially attractive. 
The memory of past crises was progressively fading away. However, a clear reversal took 
place in April 2004: the expectations of a monetary tightening in mature markets led to a 
surge in EMs sovereign spreads. 
11) The rise in the 10-year US-TB yields (end-April 2004), followed by similar measures in 
the Euro Area and Japan, was preceded by a significant gap between unadjusted correlations 
(  unadjρ ), on a slightly increasing path, and the adjusted ones (  adjρ ). This pattern indicates 
the presence of a contagion risk coming from mature markets. As Figures 17a-b show, this 
adverse shock affecting the US-TB interest rates was followed, as expected, by an increase in 
spreads and correlations, indicating a sell-off episode in EM (i.e. in presence of higher long-
term interest rates, investors dump risky assets and move towards US-TB). However, 
adjusted correlations (  adjρ ) were well below unadjusted ones (  unadjρ ), which suggests a 
differentiated behaviour as regard to EM. Investors tended to shed bonds issued by emerging 
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countries perceived as most vulnerable to a deterioration of their financing conditions. The 
abrupt rise in spreads (even if they reach levels inferior to those of past crises) shows that 
investors’ assessment of bonds issued by countries heavily dependent on external finance may 
easily change. In response to heightened uncertainty, they may sell-off bonds perceived as 
risky and prefer better quality bonds or TB. 
Figures 17a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the 10Y US-TB yields rise 
At the end of 2004 we notice an atypical evolution of long-term interest rates as a 
consequence of the gradual tightening18 of policy interest rates in the United States during 
the second semester 2004. As the long-term yields hadn’t followed the same trend, the term 
structure of interest rates started to flatten. 
12) In the run-up to the fall in the US TB yield (mid September 2004) we notice, as 
expected in the case of a positive shock on US-TB interest rate, an increase in  unadjρ  
whereas  adjρ is very low and decreases (Figure 18a). This configuration indicates that risks 
to the EM class, although moderate compared with the previous episodes, stemmed mainly 
from developments in mature markets. The EM spreads compression (Figure 18b), as well as 
the decrease in  adjρ in the aftermath of this event, indicates that the excess liquidity spurred 
the investors’ interest in risky assets (in particular, in EM bonds) and triggered a brief 
episode of indiscriminate broad-based buying. 
                                                 
18 The Federal Reserve raised 8 times, by 25 b.p. the rates of Federal Funds. 
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Figures 18a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the decrease in US long-term interest rates 
13) The period of excess global liquidity in mature markets starting roughly in 2003 is 
characterized by low spreads and adjusted correlations displaying a mean value around zero 
over the last three years (with the exception of the peaks in July 2003 in the aftermath of 
the Iraq war and the rise in oil prices and in July 2004 following the tightening of US 
monetary policy) indicating a lack of generalized EM comovement and better investors’ 
discrimination (Figures 19a-b). This could be due to the upgrade of some emerging countries 
of the EMBI Global to investment grade (e.g. Mexico, Bulgaria and Croatia) and to 
improved macroeconomic fundamentals. Sustained overall growth and strong exports enabled 
Asian and Latin America countries to record current surpluses, used, in many cases, to pay 
out the external debt service and to build up foreign reserves. As far as the fiscal stance is 
concerned, we assist to a reduction of public deficits and to an improvement in the maturity 
structure and currency composition of the public debt. Many Latin American countries 
introduced rules designed to enhance fiscal discipline19. The increasing gap between the two 
series of correlations highlights that, at present, the risks of a generalized sell-off stem mainly 
from global factors, but these risks are moderate compared with previous episodes of market 
turbulence. 
                                                 
19 For instance, Chile adopted in 2000 a rule for the structural public surplus of minimum 1 percent of GDP, Brazil 
introduced in 2000 a law of fiscal responsibility which sets a primary surplus target at each level of the government. 
Similar regulations have been adopted in 2004 by Colombia, Peru and India (IMF (2004)). 
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Figures 19a-b: Evolution of correlations and spreads during the period of excess global liquidity 
Over the recent period, the EMs became less and less intertwined and at present, the risk of 
contagion may come mainly from events taking place in mature markets. However, a shock 
coming from mature markets is likely to affect emerging countries asymmetrically. In 
particular, the countries most vulnerable to a global negative event are those having huge 
financial needs, have little fiscal discipline and display large public and external debt 
structural biases.  
Table 10 hereafter summarizes the major trends in spreads and aggregate correlations in the 
aftermath of the major events taking place during the period under consideration (	or  
indicates that the means are different at 1 percent, ≈ indicates that the means are not 
significantly different at 10 percent). We find evidence of pure contagion (excess 
comovement) in the case of the Hong-Kong market crash of October 1997, Russian crisis and 
LTCM collapse of 1998 and Argentinean banking crisis of 2001. In the wake of these events, 
the comovement unexplained by the common factors and captured by  adjρ significantly 
increases to levels superior to the 0.5 threshold. 
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Potentially systemic events over the 
period 06/1997- 02/2005 
EMBI Global 
Spreads (b.p.) 
ρunadj ρadj 
- Thai baht devaluation (July 2, 
1997) 
405  375.06 0.62  0.46 0.22 ≈ 0.23 
- Hong Kong stock market collapse 
  (Oct. 20, 1997) 
348.5 550.53 0.41 	 0.7 0.25 	 0.51  
pure contagion 
- Russian default (July 17, 1998)  643.2 	 1340 0.56 	 0.71 0.5 	 0.56  
pure contagion 
- Brazilian real devaluation  
  (Jan. 15, 1999) 
1134 	 1179.5 0.49 	 0.55 0.58  0.40 
- Argentinean bonds and US HY 
sell-      
  off (Oct. 2000) 
640.47 	 728.37 0.36 	 0.54 0.37 	 0.46 
pure contagion 
- Turkey devaluation (Feb. 22, 
2001) 
678.5 	 729.5 0.33 ≈ 0.35 0.29  0.18 
- Argentina banking crisis  
  (July 3, 2001) 
709.217	 852.87 0.4 	 0.53 0.39 	 0.51 
pure contagion 
- September 11, 2001 847.4 	 942.57   0.55 0.53  0.54 0.46 
- Argentinean default and currency  
  crisis (Jan. 3, 2002) 
813.6  671.5 0.35  0.19 0.26  0.23 
- Brazilian sell-off (mid-June, 2002) 628.3 	 783.17 0.15 	 0.30 0.13 	 0.27 
- Brazilian real depreciation  
  (End July 2002) 
790.43 	 851.67 0.31 	 0.40 0.29 	 0.37 
- 10-year US Treasury yield rise   
   End April 2004) 
413.53 	 493.17 0.48 	 0.53 0.19 	 0.36 
- Decrease in US long term interest 
  rate (Dec. 2004) 
374.93  355.27 0.28 	 0.35   0.18 	 0.20 
- Period of excess global liquidity 
   (from 2003 onwards) 
 	  
Table 10: Evolution of spreads and correlations following the crisis compared to tranquil times 
(30-day window; [T-30, T+30]) 
5 Implications for policy 
After controlling for the major common factors affecting the EM bond returns, we highlighted 
that the adjusted correlations, as measure of “pure contagion”, systematically decline from 1997 
through 2005 (Figure 2). At the same time, the widening gap between adjusted and unadjusted 
average correlations from 2003 onwards suggests that the comovement of EMs returns during 
the recent period appears to be less specific to particular EMs and driven more by external 
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events. The risk of “pure” contagion is very low at present. However, the risk of broadly defined 
contagion may come mainly from events taking place in mature markets. 
We also showed that, over the recent period, investors seem to better differentiate between 
individual emerging countries, as confirmed by decreasing and very low average correlations and 
spreads. However, some individual pairwise correlations remain high, even during the recent 
period. For instance, in 2005, the average adjusted correlation of residuals is 0.38 whereas some 
emerging countries exhibit extremely high pairwise correlations (e.g. 0.78 for Venezuela and 
Brazil, 0.74 for Brazil and Colombia, Venezuela and Colombia, or 0.7 for Panama and 
Colombia). This suggests that the distribution of bond returns is not unimodal and that there 
are underlying groups characterized by high within-group comovement. The opposite evolution 
of the underlying groups during periods of turbulence in financial markets could then explain the 
very low levels reached by the aggregate average correlations over the recent period. 
Several emerging countries characterized by important maturity mismatches (high share of 
short-term debt and/or at floating interest rates) could be particularly vulnerable to a global 
shock, like, for instance the tightening of monetary conditions in industrial countries. From this 
point of view, Brazil and Turkey hold a share of debt at floating rate of 50 percent and 
respectively, 40 percent of their total debt, at the end of 2004 (BIS (2005)). Other global risks 
that may affect EM bonds valuations are shocks in the US-HY market (e.g. the downgrading of 
Ford and General Motors at the end of 2005) or a rise in oil prices. 
Let us briefly review the major measures undertaken in some emerging countries, in the wake of 
recent financial and sovereign debt crises, in order to reduce their fiscal vulnerability and thus to 
be perceived as being safer by the market operators. Massive reductions in the debt position 
have been implemented in Thailand (reduction of 62 percent from 1996 to 2004), Mexico (42 
percent), Venezuela (22 percent) and Hungary (20 percent)20. 
As external debt mismatches have been the major aggravating factor of recent international 
financial crises, considerable efforts have been made to improve the maturity and currency 
structure of public debt. Countries like Russia, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic or Mexico took 
measures to improve the maturity debt structure in order to reduce the vulnerability to 
international liquidity shocks. Other measures aimed at stabilizing the macroeconomic stance, 
thus improving investors’ confidence, include the issuance of inflation rate-indexed rather than 
exchange-rate indexed bonds (e.g. in Brazil and Colombia) or fiscal policy regulations setting 
                                                 
20 IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2006) 
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targets and limits to several ratios of fiscal vulnerability (e.g. in Brazil and Poland). Measures of 
active public debt management have also been undertaken, such the use of excess foreign 
reserves to buy back the external debt (e.g. Brazil in 2006), debt currency swaps (e.g. Mexico in 
2005) or public borrowing in domestic currency in international markets (e.g. Colombia in 2004 
or Brazil in 2005).  
A more flexible exchange rate could increase resilience to external shocks, but at the same time, 
the move toward greater flexibility requires the presence of derivative markets to hedge the 
underlined exchange rate risk. The credibility of the public sector in international capital 
markets can be enhanced through the adoption of an inflation-targeting framework that could 
also help mitigating the maturity and currency mismatches of public debt. Recent measures in 
order to diversify the investors’ base, thus making it more stable in case of panic, need also be 
encouraged.  
Improvements in the supervision and regulation of domestic banking sectors may indirectly 
impact on investors’ behaviour in emerging bond markets. Indeed, the presence of implicit or 
explicit guarantees on bank deposits is likely to deteriorate the fiscal stance in the wake of a 
banking crisis. Measures aimed at controlling currency and maturity mismatches of the private 
sector debt could also lead to a reduction in the fiscal vulnerability and thus improve market 
perception of the public debt sustainability. 
Finally, the financial markets regulatory framework should be strengthened in order to allow 
greater transparency of financial and macroeconomic data. Global investors will therefore be less 
likely to sell off all EM bonds during turbulent times, independently of the quality of their 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
6 Conclusion 
The crises taking place in the 1990s heightened the interest for contagion and systemic risk. In 
this paper we assessed the respective part of common external factors and market behaviour in 
explaining comovements in emerging bond returns. Our analysis of emerging debt market was 
motivated by the fact that this market has been the main source of financing to EMs from the 
beginning of 1990 onwards, characterized by large fluctuations in the wake of external shocks 
and shifts in market behaviour. 
We have developed a conceptual framework based on the evolution of EM spreads and aggregate 
correlations in order to characterize investors’ attitudes towards risk in EM, highlight the 
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potential sources of risks to the EM class and distinguish between external and country specific-
driven comovement. 
This conceptual framework was then applied to a sample of 18 out of 33 emerging countries 
initially included in the EMBI Global Index from March 1997 through February 2005. In order 
to disentangle the roles of common external and idiosyncratic factors in explaining bond markets 
comovement, we performed 60-day rolling regressions of initial emerging bond returns against 
three external factors: US Treasury Bill returns for a maturity compatible with that of bonds 
included in the EMBI Global, a composite index of US stock market as a proxy for the stock 
market portfolio (SPX-Index) and a US High Yield corporate sector index (JOAO Index). The 
correlation coefficients of residuals are a measure of the excess comovement of emerging bond 
markets, comovement unexplained by common external factors and generally attributed to 
market behaviour. We found evidence of such excess comovement in the case of the Hong-Kong 
market crash of October 1997, the Russian crisis and LTCM collapse of 1998 and the 
Argentinean banking crisis of 2001. 
Our analysis puts into light that, over the recent period, EMs became less and less intertwined 
and that at present, the risk of contagion may come mainly from events taking place in mature 
markets. Nevertheless, the links between EMs seem to weaken over the recent period. Their 
comovement becomes less and less specific and mainly driven by global events taking place in 
mature markets. At present, contagion risks, even lower compared to previous crisis episodes, 
may mainly come from shocks affecting mature markets. 
Finally, policy recommendations may be derived from EMs past experience in order to reduce 
their debt variability thus making them less vulnerable to a shock that takes place in mature 
markets. Sound macroeconomic policies, in particular, prudent fiscal ones, could enhance 
government discipline and limit the spillover effects in a wake of a global shock or of a shock 
affecting another emerging country.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
March 1997 February 2005
Index Weight Index Weight
Argentina 20,00% 1,85%
Brazil 19,20% 19,20%
Bulgaria 1,80% 0,81%
Colombia 1,10% 3,37%
Croatia 0,60% *
Ecuador 1,30% 1,33%
Malaysia 2,50% 3,48%
Mexico 15,20% 18,30%
Morocco 1,10% 0,33%
Panama 1,90% 2,01%
Peru 1,30% 2,45%
Philippines 2,90% 5,32%
Poland 2,70% 1,19%
Russia 6,30% 13,04%
South Africa 0,50% 1,71%
South Korea 7,50% *
Turkey 0,90% 7,48%
Venezuela 5,60% 5,64%
Latin America 65,60% 54,15%
Asia 12,90% 8,80%
Eur&MidEast&Africa 13,90% 24,56%
Total 92,40% 87,51%
Korea were dropped out from the index
during 2004
 
i) The total return from one trading day to the next, on a single instrument included in the EMBI global   
takes into account the bond price and the coupon payment (or/and amortization if applicable) according to the 
following relation: 1
1
−++=
− )t(s
t)t(v)t(s
t ESV
AMCESV
TR , where )t(sESV  is the effective settlement value that is 
principally the bond price, )(tvC  is the coupon payment to which a holder on trade date t is entitled on value 
date v(t); (that is the date used to compute the accrued interests and generally coincides, but not always, with 
the settlement date) The coupon payment is determined by the instrument structure, ex-coupon conventions 
and holiday calendar, tAM  is the bond amortization (if applicable), also determined by the instrument 
structure, ex-coupon conventions and holiday calendar. The price of day i between the first day of market 
closure (denoted by k) and the first day of market opening (denoted by n, with n>k) is computed according to 
the relation: )ki(
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ii) SPX Index stands for Standard & Poor`s 500 (S&P500) Composite Stock Price Index which  serves as a 
common yardstick against which all US stock performance is measured. It is especially used to compare and 
evaluate the performance of institutional portfolios and has become one of the US Department of Commerce’s 
12 economic indicators. S&P500 is a market capitalization-weighted index that tracks the continuous price 
only and daily total return performance of 500 common stocks of leading domestic and foreign companies in 
leading industries within the US that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and the Nasdaq National Market System. The S&P500, a measure of large capitalization 
stocks, accounts for about 64% of the market value of shares listed on the three exchanges. 
The EMBI global is a traditional, market capitalization-
weighted index which currently covers 31 emerging market 
countries. Included in the EMBI global are US-dollar 
denominated Brady Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local 
market debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi 
sovereign entities.  
It differs from its predecessor – the Emerging Markets Bond 
Index Plus (EMBI+)- by the country selection criteria (the per 
capita income level as defined by the World Bank and the 
country debt restructuring history instead of selecting country 
solely on a sovereign credit rating basis). Precisely, EMBI 
Global includes countries classified as having low or middle per 
capita income by the World Bank or having restructured their 
external or local debt in the last 10 years or currently being in 
process of restructuring its external or local debt. By contrast, 
countries included in the EMBI+ must only be rated 
(BBB)/(Baa3) or lower by S&P and Moody`s.  
These two selection criteria allow the EMBI global to include a 
number of higher rated countries that international investors 
have nevertheless considered part of the emerging market 
universe. The index considers for inclusion emerging markets 
issues denominated in US dollars with a minimum current face 
outstanding of US$500 million and at least 2 1/2 years to 
maturity at the time of the inclusion in the index. No additional 
liquidity tests are required as it is the case with the EMBI+. 
Source: JPMorgan Methodology Brief “Introducing the JP 
Morgan Emerging Bond Index Global”, 1999.  
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Evolution of the global factors (60-day rolling average)  
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APPENDIX 4
SPX-Index coefficient estimates (95% confidence interval) - 5day Returns 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
 
 
US-HY coefficient estimates (95% confidence interval) - 5day Returns 
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APPENDIX 6 
Residual correlation matrixes (adjusted returns), rolling regressions over a 60-day window, 5-day returns  
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Brazil 0,80       
Bulgaria 0,56 0,57      
Colombia 0,42 0,42 0,28     
Croatia 0,38 0,42 0,35 0,35    
Ecuador 0,65 0,61 0,61 0,14 0,19    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,14 0,05 0,26 0,16 -0,05 0,31    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,79 0,74 0,63 0,46 0,34 0,55 0,23    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,66 0,52 0,49 0,35 0,47 0,45 0,17 0,53    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,44 0,41 0,42 0,11 0,38 0,38 0,05 0,44 0,54    
Peru 0,60 0,59 0,52 0,25 0,47 0,47 0,16 0,53 0,47 0,55    
Philippines 0,30 0,19 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,18 0,34 0,32 0,23 0,29 0,21    
Poland 0,39 0,43 0,39 0,51 0,42 0,19 0,19 0,44 0,37 0,14 0,35 0,22    
Russia 0,58 0,55 0,57 0,35 0,38 0,38 0,04 0,51 0,52 0,31 0,57 0,21 0,39   
South Africa 0,20 0,28 0,16 0,38 0,13 0,25 0,19 0,28 0,33 0,31 0,18 0,09 0,35 0,13  
South Korea 0,20 0,23 0,26 0,22 0,16 0,31 0,67 0,23 0,26 0,09 0,17 0,43 0,19 0,18 0,27 
Turkey 0,21 0,08 -0,04 0,28 0,23 0,06 0,17 0,12 0,24 0,33 0,25 0,23 0,18 0,07 0,38 0,03
Venezuela 0,63 0,64 0,28 0,37 0,34 0,42 0,06 0,60 0,52 0,57 0,63 0,23 0,28 0,42 0,31 0,18 0,30
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Brazil 0,90        
Bulgaria 0,82 0,79       
Colombia 0,37 0,38 0,41      
Croatia 0,59 0,62 0,56 0,47     
Ecuador 0,80 0,85 0,81 0,40 0,56    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,19 0,31 0,14 0,28 0,24 0,29    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,89 0,85 0,78 0,38 0,55 0,80 0,19    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,86 0,82 0,77 0,32 0,59 0,74 0,13 0,72    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,80 0,80 0,73 0,32 0,50 0,74 0,09 0,81 0,76    
Peru 0,69 0,74 0,64 0,43 0,53 0,70 0,30 0,68 0,68 0,70    
Philippines 0,53 0,51 0,48 0,30 0,35 0,52 0,38 0,52 0,49 0,48 0,47    
Poland 0,73 0,63 0,71 0,33 0,51 0,58 -0,01 0,67 0,68 0,64 0,53 0,39    
Russia 0,69 0,76 0,75 0,33 0,56 0,72 0,16 0,69 0,66 0,65 0,62 0,42 0,64   
South Africa 0,45 0,43 0,46 0,25 0,49 0,41 -0,03 0,37 0,48 0,44 0,38 0,25 0,47 0,44  
South Korea 0,45 0,43 0,39 0,24 0,22 0,35 0,22 0,34 0,41 0,39 0,20 0,46 0,29 0,29 0,15 
Turkey 0,49 0,48 0,53 0,25 0,28 0,44 -0,06 0,49 0,47 0,54 0,42 0,19 0,57 0,52 0,41 0,19
Venezuela 0,76 0,71 0,68 0,30 0,47 0,72 0,15 0,74 0,75 0,73 0,73 0,56 0,53 0,60 0,41 0,33 0,39
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Brazil 0,75        
Bulgaria 0,41 0,49       
Colombia 0,46 0,59 0,30      
Croatia 0,25 0,25 0,49 0,19     
Ecuador 0,33 0,45 0,30 0,41 0,15    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,22 0,13 0,32 -0,11 0,26 -0,04    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,80 0,74 0,43 0,42 0,21 0,39 0,22    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,54 0,54 0,60 0,32 0,35 0,23 0,31 0,53    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,59 0,58 0,41 0,47 0,15 0,34 0,13 0,68 0,44    
Peru 0,55 0,62 0,41 0,51 0,02 0,45 0,04 0,65 0,45 0,65    
Philippines 0,36 0,42 0,36 0,18 0,29 0,29 0,40 0,45 0,42 0,30 0,35    
Poland 0,49 0,51 0,39 0,42 0,27 0,22 0,04 0,55 0,37 0,47 0,35 0,26    
Russia 0,10 0,16 0,24 0,05 0,34 0,29 0,01 0,16 0,13 0,20 0,05 0,25 0,23   
South Africa 0,25 0,19 0,34 0,26 0,14 0,11 0,06 0,25 0,23 0,26 0,12 0,11 0,33 0,03  
South Korea 0,24 0,19 0,25 -0,04 0,23 0,02 0,60 0,36 0,36 0,25 0,16 0,58 0,22 0,20 0,02 
Turkey 0,17 0,18 0,24 0,12 0,05 0,18 0,06 0,17 0,18 0,24 0,11 0,06 0,08 0,03 0,28 -0,09
Venezuela 0,57 0,58 0,36 0,40 0,15 0,42 0,06 0,61 0,44 0,42 0,47 0,34 0,38 0,19 0,23 0,27 0,15
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Brazil 0,70        
Bulgaria 0,34 0,58       
Colombia 0,45 0,60 0,42      
Croatia 0,13 0,14 0,30 0,06     
Ecuador 0,20 0,31 0,21 0,18 0,02    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,33 0,43 0,37 0,25 0,13 0,17    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,57 0,67 0,47 0,45 0,11 0,38 0,35    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,38 0,35 0,36 0,14 0,31 0,15 0,36 0,23    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,46 0,67 0,50 0,51 0,09 0,27 0,27 0,56 0,15    
Peru 0,44 0,52 0,48 0,36 0,17 0,28 0,32 0,37 0,32 0,42    
Philippines 0,50 0,46 0,39 0,16 0,01 0,13 0,54 0,44 0,33 0,35 0,36    
Poland 0,45 0,46 0,31 0,33 0,08 0,37 0,25 0,45 0,35 0,39 0,36 0,30    
Russia 0,45 0,56 0,55 0,37 0,34 0,24 0,28 0,47 0,33 0,56 0,55 0,41 0,37   
South Africa 0,34 0,39 0,34 0,24 0,34 0,30 0,21 0,33 0,36 0,29 0,44 0,15 0,31 0,29  
South Korea 0,27 0,37 0,33 0,14 0,06 0,16 0,79 0,37 0,25 0,27 0,28 0,62 0,28 0,29 0,12 
Turkey 0,37 0,35 0,25 0,27 0,29 0,29 0,23 0,43 0,17 0,23 0,37 0,30 0,32 0,41 0,10 0,22
Venezuela 0,56 0,66 0,44 0,42 0,11 0,28 0,37 0,52 0,28 0,45 0,44 0,41 0,33 0,45 0,41 0,37 0,15
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Brazil 0,79        
Bulgaria 0,56 0,60       
Colombia 0,43 0,42 0,31      
Croatia 0,31 0,28 0,36 0,11     
Ecuador 0,50 0,55 0,38 0,36 0,40    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,29 0,20 0,13 0,21 0,40 0,30    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,61 0,69 0,52 0,39 0,30 0,49 0,35    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,46 0,42 0,66 0,20 0,27 0,31 0,22 0,49    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,54 0,62 0,52 0,36 0,30 0,40 0,23 0,62 0,55    
Peru 0,44 0,57 0,50 0,43 0,09 0,52 0,21 0,41 0,32 0,45    
Philippines 0,33 0,42 0,44 0,32 0,15 0,31 0,16 0,49 0,35 0,40 0,36    
Poland 0,24 0,29 0,45 0,36 0,10 0,22 0,07 0,41 0,26 0,19 0,26 0,23    
Russia 0,57 0,70 0,69 0,40 0,41 0,55 0,18 0,72 0,50 0,19 0,54 0,48 0,35   
South Africa 0,36 0,28 0,39 0,31 0,28 0,26 0,15 0,32 0,28 0,32 0,21 0,26 0,44 0,42  
South Korea 0,18 0,11 0,11 0,04 0,04 0,11 0,58 0,26 0,15 0,12 0,14 0,21 0,06 0,09 0,02 
Turkey 0,35 0,36 0,46 0,27 0,16 0,40 0,12 0,43 0,23 0,28 0,31 0,27 0,39 0,54 0,34 0,09
Venezuela 0,64 0,66 0,51 0,40 0,30 0,56 0,12 0,64 0,50 0,67 0,44 0,40 0,17 0,70 0,30 0,16 0,28
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Brazil 0,29       
Bulgaria 0,03 0,51      
Colombia 0,11 0,40 0,20     
Croatia 0,11 0,08 0,29 0,03    
Ecuador 0,17 0,59 0,32 0,36 0,31    ρadj< 0 
Malaysia -0,04 0,11 0,05 -0,05 0,31 0,10    0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,28 0,70 0,51 0,41 0,19 0,47 0,06    0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,29 0,28 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,17 0,10 0,29    0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,26 0,46 0,29 0,32 0,00 0,34 0,07 0,46 0,18    
Peru 0,09 0,53 0,39 0,35 0,04 0,51 -0,02 0,45 0,18 0,40    
Philippines 0,09 0,38 0,25 0,07 0,00 0,38 0,06 0,40 0,24 0,35 0,30    
Poland 0,27 0,07 0,13 0,08 0,13 0,13 -0,15 0,16 0,18 0,10 0,12 0,04    
Russia 0,24 0,63 0,59 0,24 0,20 0,56 -0,01 0,63 0,35 0,10 0,43 0,48 0,21   
South Africa 0,26 0,18 0,18 0,12 0,10 0,21 0,09 0,26 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,08 0,36 0,39  
South Korea 0,01 0,08 -0,07 -0,05 -0,03 0,02 0,76 0,05 0,13 0,15 -0,05 0,11 -0,12 0,07 0,04 
Turkey 0,12 0,40 0,37 0,11 0,20 0,37 0,00 0,39 0,28 0,28 0,41 0,35 0,15 0,54 0,20 0,02
Venezuela 0,24 0,53 0,27 0,31 0,10 0,39 0,06 0,40 0,28 0,36 0,34 0,22 0,08 0,43 0,14 0,11 0,37
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Brazil 0,17      
Bulgaria 0,18 0,21      
Colombia 0,11 0,60 0,15     
Croatia 0,06 0,05 0,32 0,03    
Ecuador 0,15 0,40 0,20 0,37 0,07     ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,02 0,07 0,15 -0,02 0,05 0,06     0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,08 0,56 0,10 0,50 0,15 0,26 0,02     0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco -0,04 0,16 0,18 0,08 0,11 -0,05 -0,01 0,13     0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,22 0,39 0,12 0,49 0,01 0,27 -0,06 0,39 0,06    
Peru 0,18 0,58 0,31 0,60 0,11 0,47 0,07 0,53 0,04 0,49    
Philippines 0,15 0,29 0,10 0,16 0,01 0,30 0,43 0,23 -0,10 0,10 0,24    
Poland 0,02 0,02 0,17 -0,11 0,12 0,11 0,01 0,22 0,13 0,06 0,01 0,03   
Russia 0,16 0,40 0,46 0,38 0,25 0,46 0,12 0,31 0,18 0,21 0,43 0,15 0,26  
South Africa 0,02 0,25 0,35 0,25 0,23 0,28 0,10 0,32 0,15 0,24 0,34 0,10 0,44 0,40 
South Korea 0,09 0,04 0,13 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,85 -0,03 0,04 -0,07 0,09 0,34 -0,05 0,08 0,12
Turkey -0,02 0,31 0,05 0,21 0,02 0,34 0,11 0,28 0,16 0,08 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,40 0,26 0,14
Venezuela -0,08 0,40 0,14 0,26 0,11 0,25 -0,04 0,34 0,08 0,10 0,21 0,11 0,08 0,27 0,12 0,00 0,42
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Brazil 0,06                               
Bulgaria -0,18 0,19                             
Colombia 0,19 0,66 0,40                           
Croatia 0,02 0,06 -0,05 0,01                         
Ecuador -0,01 0,58 0,31 0,49 0,17                   ρadj< 0 
Malaysia -0,07 0,25 0,21 0,26 -0,09 0,20                 0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,11 0,48 0,45 0,64 -0,09 0,40 0,33               0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco -0,02 0,14 0,11 0,08 -0,01 -0,02 0,07 0,13             0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,15 0,41 0,41 0,61 -0,06 0,38 0,29 0,63 0,00                 
Peru 0,06 0,51 0,41 0,68 0,08 0,36 0,26 0,69 0,16 0,68               
Philippines 0,15 0,41 0,16 0,50 -0,11 0,30 0,46 0,36 0,01 0,38 0,44             
Poland -0,18 0,10 0,44 0,11 -0,20 0,06 0,17 0,20 -0,08 0,20 0,10 0,06           
Russia 0,13 0,48 0,47 0,56 0,00 0,36 0,38 0,59 0,12 0,53 0,54 0,35 0,25         
South Africa -0,05 0,29 0,56 0,48 -0,16 0,17 0,23 0,44 0,02 0,51 0,40 0,19 0,49 0,40       
South Korea 0,32 0,16 0,07 0,22 0,11 0,15 0,59 0,18 0,11 0,16 0,19 0,22 -0,06 0,16 0,04     
Turkey 0,18 0,52 0,36 0,52 0,13 0,43 0,29 0,39 0,09 0,43 0,49 0,42 0,09 0,55 0,33 0,11   
Venezuela 0,14 0,67 0,28 0,63 0,02 0,59 0,23 0,46 0,07 0,40 0,47 0,50 0,02 0,56 0,18 0,17 0,48
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Brazil 0,09                             
Bulgaria 0,13 0,04                           
Colombia 0,11 0,74 0,22                         
Ecuador -0,03 0,68 0,06 0,51                 ρadj< 0 
Malaysia 0,05 0,06 -0,04 -0,03 0,31               0 ≤ ρadj < 0,4 
Mexico 0,10 0,48 0,41 0,47 0,44 0,21             0,4 ≤ ρadj < 0,7 
Morocco 0,24 0,13 0,08 -0,07 0,20 0,07 0,36           0,7 ≤ ρadj < 1 
Panama 0,20 0,66 0,20 0,70 0,32 0,16 0,34 -0,13               
Peru 0,06 0,68 -0,11 0,48 0,35 0,10 0,22 -0,01 0,54             
Philippines 0,22 0,09 0,00 -0,20 0,20 0,39 0,16 0,26 -0,12 0,00           
Poland -0,10 -0,18 0,66 0,10 -0,15 -0,14 0,29 0,04 0,00 -0,18 -0,16         
Russia 0,36 0,26 0,51 0,27 0,37 0,41 0,57 0,25 0,42 -0,03 0,20 0,24       
South Africa 0,16 -0,30 0,42 -0,07 -0,23 -0,07 0,03 0,25 -0,18 -0,21 -0,21 0,63 0,13     
Turkey 0,29 0,44 0,38 0,54 0,34 0,16 0,37 0,21 0,57 0,44 0,00 0,17 0,39 0,19   
Venezuela 0,04 0,78 0,08 0,74 0,68 -0,08 0,40 0,13 0,52 0,57 -0,23 -0,10 0,13 -0,11 0,48
 
